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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
GUARDIAN STATE BANK, a 
Utah corporation, ' 
P la in t i f f and 
Appellant, 
vs. 
F.C. STANGL I I I , 
Defendant and 
Respondent. ] 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
Case No. 20158 
Appellant Guardian State Bank ("Guardian") w i l l respond herein to 
cer ta in of the arguments raised by Respondent F.C. Stangl I I I . ("Stangl") in 
his Reply Br ie f . 
I . PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
Stangl would l i k e to characterize t h i s case as one simply involv ing 
a negotiated settlement of a dispute between sophist icated business men 
represented by lawyers where Guardian negotiated a bad deal and now wants to 
back out of the t ransact ion. To characterize th i s case in that manner is a 
l i t t l e l i k e saying a counter fe i ter i s someone who makes a l o t of money. I t 
simply doesn't t e l l the real s tory . 
I f tha t were a l l that was involved in th i s case, t h i s appeal would 
never have been f i l e d . Guardian i s not asking t h i s Court to l e t i t out of a 
bad deal. Guardian is asking this Court to require Stangl to live up to the 
bargain he really made and pay his legal obligation. 
Stangl makes a very telling statement in his Brief: 
"At no time did either Stangl or his counsel establish as a 
condition to the transaction that bank had to indorse the 
Sargetis note with recourse. That is simply the way it 
worked out." [Stangl Brief, p. 5] 
Exactly. At no time did the parties agree that Guardian would have any 
liability whatsoever to Stangl on the original Note. Stangl never bargained 
for an agreement that the original Note would be indorsed with recourse. 
Stangl never obtained such an agreement and knew that was not the agreement 
reached between the parties. Stangl canft avoid his obligation by ignoring 
the real bargain he made and focusing solely upon the written indorsement. 
The parole evidence introduced below demonstrated beyond doubt that the real 
bargain of the parties was that Guardian would have no liability. See, 
Gensplit Finance Corp. v. Link Power & Machinery, 36 U.C.C. Reporting 
Service 588 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). 
I I . OBJECTIONS TO STANGL'S STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The fo l lowing contentions made by Stangl in his Statement of Facts 
are not supported by the record: 
1 . Stangl claims that in his i n i t i a l meeting wi th Mr. Webb, the 
President of Guardian, tha t Stangl never "unequivocally" agreed to pay o f f 
the August 29, 1978 Note (the "o r ig ina l Note") and that he t o l d Webb he 
needed to consult wi th counsel before he decided what to do about the 
s i t u a t i o n . [Stangl 's B r ie f , p. 3] 
Stangl 's claim in t h i s regard not only d i r ec t l y contradicts the 
testimony of Webb [R. 561, l i n e 19 - 562, l i n e 10 ] , but is also inconsistent 
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wi th Stangl 's testimony. Stangl t e s t i f i e d he to ld Webb that jjp Guardian was 
going to require him to pay a l l o f the o r ig ina l Note r i gh t then, tha t he was 
going to need an at torney 's help In f i gu r ing out what to do. Stangl 
t e s t i f i e d , however, tha t during the I n i t i a l meeting he and Webb came to an 
agreement that the o r ig ina l loan would not a l l have to be paid at that time 
but would be repayable one-half around 60 days from then and the remainder 
In another year. [R. 627, l i n e 19 - 628, l i n e 7] 
The evidence was simply undisputed tha t during the i n i t i a l meeting 
between Webb and Stangl, the repayment schedule on the o r ig ina l Note was 
agreed to , the payment terms of the May 11 , 1981 Note (the "new Note") to be 
executed by Stangl were agreed to and Stangl to ld the Bank he wanted the old 
Note and Guaranty so tha t he could attempt to co l l ec t from John Sargetis 
Ford, Inc. (the "dealership") and from John Sargetis ( "Sarget is" ) . [R. 342; 
R. 561, l i n e 19 - 562, l i n e 10; R. 627, l i n e 19; 628 l i n e 7; 675 l ines 17 -
22] 
2. Stangl appears to contend that most of the substance of the 
t ransact ion was negotiated between lawyers. [Stangl 's B r ie f , p. 5] 
However, the evidence was that the agreement was reached in the 
f i r s t meeting between Webb and Stangl and tha t the attorneys were simply to 
document that agreement. [ I d . ] In Stangl1s words, the attorneys were to 
"wr i te down the legalees fo r the arrangements we'd made." [R. 629, l i n e 24] 
3. Stangl states that the essence of the transact ion was that 
Stangl would purchase the o r ig ina l Note and Guaranty by giv ing Guardian a 
new Note fo r the amount due, bring the past due in te res t current and forego 
any su i t or claim wi th respect to the Guaranty. [Stangl 's B r ie f , p. 5] 
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The true essence of the transact ion was tha t Stangl requested and 
was given addi t ional time to pay his ob l iga t ion to the Bank, and Stangl was 
given the Note and Guaranty to attempt to co l l e c t against the dealership and 
Sarget is. The t ransact ion was structured as a purchase of the Note and 
Guaranty because of Stangl 's concern tha t i f the transact ion was structured 
as a payment of the old Note wi th a new Note tha t his r igh ts against the 
dealership and Sargetis would be impaired. [R. 626, l ines 19 - 25] 
I I I . THIS APPEAL WAS TIMELY FILED 
A. An Extension of Time Was Not Necessary. 
Stangl , in a very narrow reading of U.R.C.P., Rule 73(a), argues 
tha t because the p o s t - t r i a l motions f i l e d by Guardian were vo lun ta r i l y 
withdrawn on August 15, 1984, rather than granted or denied, tha t t h i s 
appeal was not t imely f i l e d . 
Of course, under Rule 73(a), where p o s t - t r i a l motions are f i l e d the 
time fo r f i l i n g an appeal commences to run anew once those motions are 
decided. Rule 73(a) does not spec i f i ca l l y address one way or another what 
happens when a p o s t - t r i a l motion i s withdrawn vo lun ta r i l y without a decision 
from the Court. However, there does not appear to be any reason fo r 
d i f f e r e n t i a t i n g between the s i tua t ion where a p o s t - t r i a l motion is ac tua l ly 
decided by the Court and where the p o s t - t r i a l motion i s simply 
withdrawn. 
The only concern should be whether a p o s t - t r i a l motion is 
f r i vo lous and only f i l e d to extend the time fo r appeal. This 
concern i s present whether the motion i s denied or withdrawn. 
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Out of an abundance of caut ion, Guardian obtained an Order from the 
D i s t r i c t Court on August 17, extending the time for f i l i n g a Notice of 
Appeal 30 days. Guardian f i l e d i t s Notice of Appeal the same day. However, 
i t i s respect fu l ly submitted tha t t h i s Court should determine tha t the Order 
extending the time fo r appeal was unnecessary and that under Rule 73(a), 
when Guardian vo lun ta r i l y withdrew i t s motions on August 15, the time fo r 
f i l i n g an appeal commenced to run anew. 
B. Excusable Neglect. 
Stangl fu r ther argues that the D i s t r i c t Court erred in granting an 
extension of the time for f i l i n g an appeal because i t was not excusable 
neglect fo r counsel to withdraw the p o s t - t r i a l motions rather than 
requesting those motions be denied. I f a withdrawn motion does not t o l l the 
time fo r appeal, Rule 73(a) i s at best unclear in that regard and i t was 
reasonable fo r Guardian to believe tha t the time for appeal would commence 
wi th the withdrawal of the motions. In the event th i s Court holds the 
appeal period did not commence a t tha t t ime, Guardian's mistake was 
cer ta in ly excusable. 
IV. EVEN IF GUARDIAN'S INDORSEMENT OF THE ORIGINAL NOTE IS VALID, 
GUARDIAN IS NOT LIABLE TO STANGL 
A. Guardian Has Not Raised Issues for the F i r s t Time on Appeal. 
Stangl 's argument tha t Guardian has raised issues fo r the f i r s t 
time on appeal is in e r ro r . Stangl 's posi t ion can only be supported by an 
unduly r e s t r i c t i v e in te rp re ta t ion of the law and the issues which were 
before the Tr ia l Court. In f a c t , a l l of the issues raised by Guardian on 
t h i s appeal were before the Tr ia l Court. 
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Guardian has cont inual ly asserted that i f Guardian i s l i a b l e to 
Stangl on the o r ig ina l Note, Guardian i s e n t i t l e d to recover from Stangl on 
his Guaranty and that those l i a b i l i t i e s o f f se t each other. Guardian has 
also cont inual ly asserted tha t i t i s not l i a b l e to Stangl on i t s indorsement 
because the o r ig ina l Note and Guaranty were only given to Stangl to enable 
him to co l l ec t from the dealership and Sargetis and tha t Guardian's 
indorsement and del ivery of the o r ig ina l Note to Stangl did not have the 
e f fec t of making Guardian l i a b l e to Stangl on tha t Note. [See, e . g . , R. 26; 
117-118, 145, 205-206, 347] The undisputed evidence at t r i a l supported 
Guardian's pos i t ion on these issues. 
Guardian has not raised addi t ional issues on appeal but has simply 
c i ted addi t ional au thor i t ies in support of i t s pos i t ion on these issues to 
show (1) Guardian is e n t i t l e d to o f f se t the l i a b i l i t y which Stangl has on 
the Guaranty by v i r tue of subrogation, (2) Guardian is not l i a b l e under i t s 
indorsement which was only given to allow co l lec t ion against other part ies 
as Guardian was only an accommodation indorser, and (3) Guardian's 
indorsement and del ivery of the o r ig ina l Note to Stangl did not render 
Guardian l i a b l e to Stangl , but rather discharged any l i a b i l i t y . 
A party is not barred from presenting addi t ional au thor i t ies on 
appeal in support of i t s pos i t ion on an issue. Nor i s a new issue created 
upon appeal merely by the use of d i f f e ren t terminology. S im i l a r l y , simply 
because an issue was not presented to the t r i a l court in as sat is fac tory 
manner as i t is presented on appeal does not give r i se to a new issue. 
Young v. Saroukos, 189 A.2d 437 (Dela. 1963); People v. Va l le jos , 59 
Cal.Rptr. 450 (Cal. 1967); Meuse-Rhine-Ijssel Catt le Breeders of Canada, 
L td . v. Y-Tex Corporation, 590 P.2d 1306 (Wyo. 1979). 
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For example, in the Y-Tex Corp. case, which is directly on point, 
the applicable provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code on an issue between 
the parties had not been brought to the attention of or considered by the 
Trial Court. The appellate court rejected the contention that the 
applicability of the Uniform Commercial Code on the issue between the 
parties could, therefore, not be raised or considered on appeal, stating: 
"It is not considered a new issue to consider additional 
relevant authority in the disposition of a case. This does 
not interfere with the course of the litigation selected by 
the parties. There is no reason to keep secret the proper 
law applicable to a case just because overlooked. The 
Trial Judge and the parties had available the U.C.C. to the 
extent applicable. The U.C.C. became a part of the 
contract as though written into its terms." [590 P.2d at 
1309] 
Both trial courts and appeallate courts have the duty to apply the 
correct principles of law to the issues involved in a case, whether or not 
either party has argued such principles. A court is not limited to simply 
choosing between the legal principles relied upon by the parties, whether or 
not correct. In this regard, many times appeals are decided based upon 
2 
legal principles that have not been advanced by either party. 
2 Even if this Court were to determine that new issues have been 
raised on appeal, this Court may nevertheless decide any such 
issues. First, it is not improper to raise new issues on appeal 
where the underlying facts are not in dispute. See, e.g., State 
v. Lee, 633 P.2d 48 (Ut. 1981) (Maughan, J., dissenting)! People 
y. Vallejos, supra; Burdette y. Rollefson Const. Co., 344 P.2d 
307 (Cal. 1959). The underlying facts upon which all of 
Guardian's arguments which Stangl attacks are premised upon 
undisputed facts. Second, this Court has the discretion to hear 
new issues where justice requires it. Earl M. Jorgensen Co. v. 
Mark Construction Inc., 540 P.2d 978 (Ha. 1975). 
B. Guardian is Entitled to Setoff Stangl '$ L iab i l i t y Under His 
Guaranty. 
1. Subrogation. 
Stangl argues that Guardian is not entitled to enforce Stangl's 
liability on his Guaranty as a setoff to any liability of Guardian on the 
original Note because Stangl owns the Guaranty and the Guaranty is a 
"separate and distinct" instrument from the original Note. 
Stangl would understandably like to chop up the transaction 
into the smallest pieces possible in the hope that the transaction can no 
longer be recognized. However, the transaction cannot be artifically 
truncated. The fact of the matter is that as part of a single transaction 
pursuant to which Stangl agreed to pay his debt to Guardian by executing a 
new Note, he received the original Note and Guaranty from Guardian to 
attempt collection from the dealership and Sargetis. If Guardian is liable 
on the original Note, Guardian has all of the rights of a holder of that 
Note, including the right to recover from Stangl on his Guaranty of the Note. 
Significantly, Stangl has not cited cme case which would deny 
Guardian the right to recover against Stangl on his Guaranty. Rather, 
Stangl has simply attempted to distinguish on irrelevant grounds some of the 
authorities cited by Guardian. However, the principle of law set forth by 
Guardian that an indorser who has to pay a Promissory note is subrogated to 
all of the rights for recovery not only on the Note but on the underlying 
indebtedness is well established and stands unrebutted by Stangl. 
2. Merger. 
Stangl argues that the original Note has been merged into the 
Judgment entered in th is action and no longer exists as an instrument upon 
which a subrogation claim may be based. Stangl's argument misstates the law. 
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The merger doctr ine only applies to merge the l i a b i l i t y of the 
party against whom a Judgment is obtained on a Note in to the Judgment 
i t s e l f . The merger doctr ine does niot ext inguish the l i a b i l i t i e s of any 
other pa r t i es . Thus, when a Judgment i s entered against an indorser, the 
Note does not cease to ex i s t and the indorser i s en t i t l ed to subrogation and 
to co l l ec t the Note. See, e . g . , Whitten v. Kroeger, 82 P.2d 668 (Okla. 
1938). 
Under Stangl 's argument, the o r ig ina l maker of a Note would 
always be re l ieved of a l l respons ib i l i t y fo r payment of a Note once a 
Judgment was entered determining that an indorser was l i a b l e . Or, i f a 
payee was only able to obtain service of process on one co-maker and 
obtained a Judgment against that co-maker, the payee could not thereaf ter 
obtain Judgment on the Note against a second co-maker. Such resul ts are 
absurd. An indorser or other party to a Note simply doesn't have to give up 
his r i gh t to have a j u d i c i a l determination of his l i a b i i l t y or r isk los ing 
his r i gh t of subrogation. 
C. Guardian has Been Discharged By Stangl 's Reacquisition of the 
Note and Guaranty. 
Stangl doesn't rea l l y deal w i th Guardian's argument that his 
reacquis i t ion of the o r ig ina l Note and Guaranty had the e f fec t of 
discharging Guardian pursuant to U.C.A. Sec. 70A-3-208 (1953). Stangl is 
content to d is t ingu ish the cases c i ted by Guardian on the inconsequential 
ground that because those cases (holding that one who signs a separate 
Guaranty of a Note is a "par ty" to tha t Note) involved another section of 
A r t i c l e 3 of the Commercial Code that Guardian's au thor i t ies are 
inappl icable to t h i s case. Stangl concludes simply tha t i t i s not necessary 
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fo r him to "address cases dealing with other statutes that say black is 
wh i te " . [Stangl B r i e f , pp. 13-14] 
Stangl 's analysis i s super f i c ia l at best. The fac t tha t the cases 
c i t ed by Guardian involved another section under A r t i c l e 3 of the Commercial 
Code appears inconsequential. The determination of who i s a "party" to an 
"instrument" fo r the purposes of A r t i c l e 3 i s presumptively uniform and 
should not d i f f e r based upon what spec i f ic section of A r t i c l e 3 is involved 
unless there i s some compelling reason for such a d i s t i n c t i o n . Stangl has 
of fered no reason whatsoever fo r such a d i s t i n c t i o n . 
The cases c i ted by Guardian are f u l l y applicable to the present 
s i t u a t i o n . There i s no good reason that the r igh ts and obl igat ions f lowing 
between Stangl and Guardian should hinge on the question of which piece of 
paper Stangl signed his Guaranty. As between the o r ig ina l part ies to the 
t ransact ion , Stangl should be t reated no d i f f e r e n t l y than i f h is Guaranty 
were signed on the o r ig ina l Note i t s e l f . 
D. Guardian i s an "Accommodation Indorser". 
Stangl argues t h a t , as a matter of law, Guardian i s not an 
accommodation indorser of the o r ig ina l Note because Guardian sold tha t Note 
to Stangl in exchange fo r the new Note and t h a t , as Guardian was in the 
chain of t i t l e , there was a presumption tha t Guardian was not an 
accommodation indorser. 
Stangl ignores the undisputed evidence in the Court below that 
Stangl and his attorney to ld Guardian tha t the reason he wanted Guardian to 
give him the o r ig ina l Note and Guaranty was so that he could attempt to 
co l l ec t from the assets of the dealership and Sargetis and tha t Guardian 
only gave him the o r ig ina l Note and Guaranty to c o l l e c t from those par t ies . 
This evidence c lear l y carr ied Guardian's burden of showing Guardian was an 
-10-
accommodation indorser under the author i t ies c i ted in Guardian's opening 
Br ief [ p . 16 ] . 
V. GUARDIAN'S INDORSEMENT IS INVALID AND UNENFORCEABLE 
A. Guardian i s En t i t led to Rel ief For Fraud. 
Stangl professes to be confused as to j u s t what Guardian claims 
const i tu ted the fraud in t h i s case. I t i s respect fu l ly submitted tha t 
Stangl 's confusion i s sel f -generated. The fraud claim i s c lear . Both 
Stangl and his attorney represented to Guardian tha t Stangl was going to pay 
his debt but needed more time and that Stangl simply wanted a l l of 
Guardian's r igh ts i n the o r ig ina l Note and Guaranty to attempt co l lec t ion 
from the dealership and Sargetis, when Stangl 's real in ten t was exactly the 
•+ 3 opposite. 
1 . Duty to Speak. 
Stangl claims that an omission i s only fraudulent where there 
ex is ts a duty to speak and tha t where the par t ies deal a t arms length and 
the facts are reasonably w i th in the knowledge of both par t ies , there i s no 
duty to speak. 
The answer to th i s contention i s twofo ld. F i r s t , Stangl <ti_d in 
fac t speak, but d i d n ' t t e l l the whole t r u t h and misled Guardian. Second, 
the fac t that Stangl did not intend to pay his debt and did not want the 
Stangl 's co l l a te ra l estoppel argument [Stangl B r ie f , p. 20] i s 
without mer i t . The Searle Bros, case c i ted by Stangl 
spec i f i ca l l y recognized that co l l a te ra l estoppel only applies 
where the issue decided in a p r io r case was ident ica l wi th the 
issue presented in a l a t e r case. The issue of Stangl 's l i a b i l i t y 
fo r fraud was never submitted to or determined by the ju ry in the 
present case. Obviously, there can be more than one proximate 
cause of damage. Jacques v. Farrimond, 380 P.2d 133 (Ut. 1963). 
The fac t that the Judgment against Guardian's attorney has been 
paid and not appealed does not e f f ec t Guardian's separate and 
d i s t i n c t causes of act ion against Stangl. Jensen v. Eddy, 514 
P.2d 1142 (Ut. 1973). 
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or ig ina l Note and Guaranty simply to go a f te r the dealership and Sargetis, 
but i n fac t secret ly intended to evade his ob l iga t ion by seeking to hold 
Guardian l i a b l e on i t s indorsement was not reasonably w i th in Guardian's 
knowledge. 
Stangl ignores the au thor i t ies c i ted by Guardian in i t s Br ief 
[pp. 19-20] which demonstrate beyond dispute tha t even i f Stangl i n i t i a l l y 
had no duty to speak, once Stangl and his attorney opened t h e i r mouths and 
t o l d Guardian why they wanted the o r ig ina l Note and Guaranty, they were 
obl igated to t e l l Guardian the whole t r u th and not to mislead and deceive 
Guardian by omi t t ing the cruc ia l fac t tha t Stangl intended to attempt to 
evade his ob l iga t ion by holding Guardian l i a b l e on i t s indorsement. 
Stangl 's ob l iga t ion did not depend upon the existence of a conf ident ia l 
re la t ionsh ip and the fac t that the part ies deal t a t arms1 length i s 
i r r e l e v a n t . See, e . g . , A.C. Heise v. P i l o t Rock Lumber Co., 352 P.2d 1072 
(Ore. 1960). 
2. Duty to Disclose Information Later Acquired. 
Stangl attempts to avoid the consequences of his fraud by 
arguing that when he t o l d Webb during t h e i r i n i t i a l meeting that Stangl 
would pay the debt but needed more time and tha t he only wanted the o r ig ina l 
Note and Guaranty to attempt co l lec t ion from the dealership and Sargetis, 
Stangl did not know he had the legal r i gh t to hold Guardian l i a b l e on i t s 
indorsement. Stangl claims he was not advised of tha t fac t by his counsel 
u n t i l shor t ly before the t ransact ion was consummated. 
Stangl therefore concludes that he could not have committed any 
fraud because a t the time he to ld Guardian why he wanted the Note and 
Guaranty, he did not intend to hold Guardian l i a b l e . Stangl asserts he had 
-12-
no duty to correct his previous representation when he learned the new 
fac ts . The law is to the contrary. St. Joseph Hospital v. Corbetta 
Construction Co., I nc . , 316 N.E.2d 51 (111. 1974); Mammas v. Pro Valley 
Townhouses, I nc . , 638 P.2d 1367, 1369 (Ar iz . 1981); Stevens v. Marco, 305 
P.2d 669, 683 (Cal. 1957); Restatement of Torts 2d, Sec. 551(2)(c); 
Prosser's Handbook on the Law of Tor ts , Sec. 106 (4th Ed. 1971). 
Thus, in the St . Joseph Hospital case, supra, the Court 
observed: 
" I t i s also well established that where one has made a 
statement which at tha t time i s t rue but subsequently 
acquires new information which makes i t untrue or 
misleading, he must disclose such information to anyone 
whom he knows to be acting on the basis of the or ig ina l 
statement — or be g u i l t y of fraud or dece i t . " [316 N.E.2d 
at 71] 
3. Intent to Pay New Note. 
Stangl contends tha t he d i d n ' t defraud Guardian by executing 
the new Note whereby he uncondit ional ly promised and agreed to pay Guardian 
the amount of tha t Note in two equal instal lments in July of 1981 and 1982 
because he admitted he was l i a b l e on the new Note subject to Guardian's 
l i a b i l i t y to him on the o r ig ina l Note. This argument is sophist ry. 
In executing the new Note, Stangl uncondit ional ly represented 
and agreed to pay his debt to the Bank s t r i c t l y in accordance wi th the terms 
of the Note. Stangl 's t rue in tent in the t ransact ion was not to pay his 
debt but to s l ide out of i t . The only way he intended to pay Guardian one 
cent is i f he co l lected from the dealership or Sargetis. That simply is not 
what Stangl promised when he signed the new Note. Stangl 's promise to pay 
his debt in accordance wi th the terms of the new Note when he had absolutely 
no in ten t of performing tha t promise const i tu ted f raud. 
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B. The Doctrine of Elect ion of Remedies Does Not Bar Guardian From 
Equitable Rel ie f Based Upon Mistake. 
Stangl seeks to character ize th i s case as one where Guardian 
attempted below to re ta in the favorable parts of a t ransact ion and be 
re l ieved of the unfavorable aspects of that t ransact ion. Stangl argues that 
t h i s act ion was brought by Guardian sole ly as a case a t law fo r damages and 
4 
tha t no "a f f i rma t i ve " equitable r e l i e f was ever sought. Consequently, 
Stangl concludes tha t Guardian elected purely a legal remedy and cannot 
"change i t s en t i re theory of the case" and ask fo r equitable r e l i e f . 
Stangl 's claims are not supported by the record or the con t ro l l i ng 
au tho r i t i es . 
1 . Guardian's Pleadings. 
From the very beginning of t h i s case, Guardian has sought 
a l te rna t ive legal or equi table remedies. Guardian spec i f i ca l l y requested 
declaratory r e l i e f in i t s Complaint determining the r igh ts and l i a b i l i t i e s 
of the part ies w i th respect to the t ransact ion. The prayer of Guardian's 
Complaint, in add i t ion to the speci f ic prayers for r e l i e f , also requested 
"such other, fu r the r or d i f f e ren t r e l i e f as the law may require or as the 
Court may deem j u s t and proper." [R. 2-6] In Guardian's Answer to the 
Counterclaim, Guardian also raised a number of equitable defenses, including 
mistake, laches, estoppel, f raud, bad f a i t h and unclean hands, and requested 
Stangl 's argument is inconsistent because he l a t e r admits 
Guardian raised the equitable defense of mistake as a defense to 
the Counterclaim and sought equitable r e l i e f in the form of a 
declaratory judgment in i t s Complaint. 
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in i t s prayer, among other th ings, such " fu r ther r e l i e f as the Court deems 
j u s t and equitable in the premises." 
2. The Declaratory Rel ief Claim. 
Stangl fu r ther argues tha t Guardian's claim for declaratory 
r e l i e f did not enable the Court to grant equitable remedies because a 
declaratory r e l i e f act ion w i l l not l i e where the purpose is to determine the 
suf f ic iency of legal defenses to a pending action and i t was thus proper for 
the t r i a l court to dismiss the declaratory count. This argument begs the 
po in t . The cases previously c i ted by Guardian [Guardian's Br ie f , p. 24] 
hold tha t even i f a party i s not e n t i t l e d to the speci f ic equitable r e l i e f 
5 
requested, the Court can nevertheless grant any other equitable r e l i e f . 
3. Rule 54(c). 
F i na l l y , Stangl does not respond to the author i t ies c i ted in 
Guardian's opening Br ie f , [ p . 25 ] , tha t under Rule 54(c) U.R.C.P., a Court 
can grant any r e l i e f to which a party i s e n t i t l e d , whether legal or 
equi tab le, and whether or not spec i f i ca l l y requested. 
In addi t ion to the author i t ies previously c i t e d , the case of 
Reynolds v. Slaughter, 451 F.2d 254 (10th Ci r . 1976) is c losely on po in t . 
There, the Tenth C i r cu i t held that P l a i n t i f f could not recover damages for 
breach of contract because of the bar of the statute of frauds. However, 
Moreover, contrary to Stangl ' s imp l i ca t ion , the declaratory 
r e l i e f cause of act ion was never dismissed as being redundant or 
improper. In f a c t , whether Guardian was e n t i t l e d to declaratory 
r e l i e f was one of the speci f ic contested issues of law to be 
l i t i g a t e d at t r i a l . [R. 346], the t r i a l court never spec i f i ca l l y 
ruled on tha t issue and simply as par t of the f i n a l Judgment 
entered Judgment in favor of Stangl on the declaratory r e l i e f 
cause of ac t ion . 
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the Court held that under Rule 54(c) P l a i n t i f f could obtain r e s t i t u t i o n , 
even though he had not spec i f i ca l l y requested i t in his Complaint, and tha t 
the doctr ine of e lect ion of remedies was not a bar to obtaining that 
r e l i e f . To the same e f f e c t , see Kansas City St . L. and C.R. Co. v. Alton R. 
Co., 124 F.2d 780 (7th Cir . 1941); Perkins v. Remil lard, 84 F.Supp. 224 
(D.Mass. 1949); 6 Moore's Federal Pract ice, Sec. 54.62. 
Consequently, Guardian i s e n t i t l e d to reformation of i t s 
indorsement or rescission based upon i t s mistake of fac t which was induced 
and known by Stangl. 
C. The Original Note and Guaranty Were Only Delivered To Stangl 
For the Special Purpose of Col lect ing From Other Par t ies. 
Stangl claims that Guardian's argument under Sec. 70A-3-306, 
U.C.A., tha t Guardian i s not l i a b l e to Stangl on the indorsement of the 
o r ig ina l Note because that Note was only given to Stangl fo r the special 
purpose of enabling Stangl to attempt to co l l ec t from the dealership and 
Sargetis must f a i l because there i s no evidence of such an agreement between 
the pa r t i es . 
To the contrary , the undisputed evidence was that Stangl and his 
attorney represented to Guardian they wanted the o r ig ina l Note and Guaranty 
fo r that purpose and that was the only reason Stangl received those 
documents. Stangl cannot prevai l on the specious d i s t i nc t i on tha t there 
wasn't an agreement because he represented he only wanted documents for a 
speci f ic purpose, he d i d n ' t expressly say he agreed he would only use the 
documents fo r that purpose. 
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H, Stangi Gave No Consideration for the Original Note and Guaranty. 
Stangi asserts t h ^ t ho t i indp<"i
 v* . ^<siderat ion f ' i 
*^ o r i g i n a l Note ^ <<> ja* ; in defenses r , -awv- * he 
had" to the Guaranty. 
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were, btdriy- '" ^ 1 *' v •'• -1 * >~ ^rguabV-
defense tw th* guaranty ^nH W*Q iebt 
Guardian immediately. Ther*>fo*v payment * + $ K ^ nasf i.. *-v e s t 
*-•* * •
 +
 r d t t whereby 
Stangi fu r the r contends * •* * h> ^ *~. nt c • - l e r a t i o n f o r 
men 
necessar * • -*- «v' * o n v K i * ^ " — - M s « • ,*•.•>•. * - n^ n*w Note. 
in ib argument ' - S ^ - J H T M 
Thp f - * r- , t — n~ - i , r 
transact ^ nmi
 f,rv -^ whether considers* v f *Hr- ^ther 
N o t e ' •• ' * • •• ' i ) d v - S t a » « ; i a n r n '• < > 
indebtedness, decreased the i n t e r e s t ra te and qavf him the o r i g i n - Note and 
"
imp1 tn rol ler f from \api f»t ] \ and t he dealership. 
Good Fa i th is a Defense to Stangi 's Claim. 
Stangi has f ^ + T . i > " i ^ n u i - d ^ * f; « *• n, wi thout ever c i t i n g 
one a u t h o r i t y , I::i iiat - lei ense to h is 
attempt to enforce l i aM i - t , , i m n s * bu -* - • -^ ndorsement, as I f by 
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ignoring the relevant law i t w i l l go away. Stangl has good reason to wish 
good f a i t h were i r r e l evan t under the Commercial Code. However, the draf ters 
of the Commercial Code were not fear fu l of Stangl 's doomsday argument that 
to require businessmen to act honestly would br ing commerce to a h a l t . The 
au thor i t ies previously c i ted by Guardian [Guardian !s Br ie f , p. 27] bar 
Stangl 's c la im. 
V I . STANGL IS NOT ENTITLED TO RECOVER HIS ATTORNEYS' FEES 
Even i f t h i s Court should a f f i rm the Judgment in favor of Stangl , 
the t r i a l court acted co r rec t l y in refusing to award Stangl his at torneys' 
fees. 
In the f i r s t place, there was no basis fo r the t r i a l court to award 
Stangl his at torneys ' fees because there was no wr i t t en agreement between 
Guardian and Stangl fo r the payment of at torneys' fees incurred in 
co l l ec t i ng the o r ig ina l Note. The o r ig ina l Note which Guardian indorsed 
only provided that the maker would pay at torneys' fees in the event of legal 
act ion to co l l ec t the Note. [See Ex. 1] The o r ig ina l Note contained no 
provision ob l igat ing indorsers to pay at torneys' fees. The o r ig ina l Note 
spec i f i ca l l y provided t h a t , "the undersigned agrees to pay a l l expenses of 
co l l ec t ion of t h i s note, including reasonable attorneys' fees and Court 
cos ts . " "The undersigned" was John Sargetis Fine Cars, Inc. 
When the o r ig ina l Note sought to a f fec t the r igh ts of indorsers, i t 
spec i f i ca l l y named indorsers. Thus, the provis ion immediately fo l lowing the 
attorneys fee provision provided, uevery maker, indorser, or guarantor of 
t h i s note waives presentment, demand, not ice . . . " This provis ion did not 
include an agreement that indorsers would pay at torneys' fees. See, e . g . , 
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r r ^ r . *4? : a rr< - o . , ~, o - - . ( T e n n . 1 8 9 6 ) , Robinson 
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recover attorneys' fees. ?M 
making that determination. See, e . g . , Fullmer v. Blood, 546 P./* M ^ 
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American Gypsum Trust v. Georgia Pacific Corp., 542 P.2d 658 ( l i t , 1973); 
Amoss v. burimoii, -V" K M *V (Ut. 1966). 
CONCLUSION 
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